### Off

#### Sunshine isn’t energy production

Division of Conservation of Solar Application, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1980 “An Analysis of Federal Incentives used to Stimulate Energy Production”

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/67538352/Federal-Incentives-for-Energy-Production-1980> p42

Discussing governmental actions In a field that lacks consistent Policy is difficult, since boundaries defining energy actions are unclear. All governmental actions probably have at least some indirect relevance to energy. If a consistent Policy did exist, the discussion could focus on those actions that were part of the planned and consistent program. For this analysis, however, boundaries must be somewhat arbitrarily defined. First, this discussion will include only those actions taken by the Federal Government; relevant actions of state and local governments are not considered. Second, the discussion covers only those Federal Government actions in which major causes included an attempt to Influence energy or major effects included some Influence on energy. Within those limits, the discussion considers actions related to both production and consumption, although production receives the most emphasis. It also includes actions relating to both increases and decreases In energy consumption or production. Energy production Is defined as the transformation of natural resources into commonly used forms of energy such as heat, light, and electricity. By this definition, the shining of the sun or the running of a river are not examples of energy production, but the installation of solar panels or the construction of a hydroelectric dam are. Energy consumption is defined as the use of one of these common, "manufactured" forms of energy. Under this definition sunbathing is not energy consumption, but heating water by means of a solar panel is. In both definitions, the crucial ingredient is the application of technology and resources to change a natural resource into a useful energy form.

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan

**American Heritage** Dictionary 2000 [www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### Reduce excludes removal

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p.80

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c. 203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may "reduce" the witness fees and other costs, but "not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases" which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word "reduce," in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state.— Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

#### Restrictions are regulatory prohibitions

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p410

N.D.Okla. 1939. "Restriction," as used in the statutes concerning restriction on alienation of lands inherited from deceased Osage allottees, is synonymous with "prohibition." Act April J8, 1912. §§ 6, 7, 37 Stat. 87, 88.—U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F.Supp. 13, appeal dismissed 111 F.2d 898.— Indians 15(1).

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p414

N.II. 1938. As used in statute giving towns power to "regulate and restrict" buildings by zoning regulations, "regulation" is synonymous with "restrict" and "restrictions" are embraced in "regulations. Puh.Laws. 1926, c. 41. W A»-y\* r

#### Violations

The aff only speculates about USFG action on solar restrictions

#### 1. Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

#### 2. Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

####  If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

### Off

#### The aff’s focus on the relation between the human and the sun mystifies the material roots of profit in the exploitation of labor rather than nature

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkingandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

In the 21st century, global capitalism's commodification of all aspects of life has reached new heights, requiring new modes of explaining away the material roots. From cloning and bioengineered food, to ever-newer forms of human-technological hybrids, to overfishing and industrialization of slaughterhouses, to the privatization of public sources of water and the selling of "hot air" (which makes it possible for rich nations to avoid lowering emissions), to the "synthetic biology" by which biocapitalists like J. Craig Venter hope new living creatures will be produced to substitute fossil fuels—there is no aspect of social or natural life that is immune from the market. Capital's endless and inherently crisis-ridden drive to accumulate profit has, on the one hand, led to a new scramble among nations of the global North to privatize the world's dwindling natural resources regardless of the human and ecological consequences. What this competitive drive has lead to, among other things, is the scientific explorations of new bio-horizons: what Venter calls a "new industrial revolution" (Pollack). On the other hand, the most recent effects of capitalist crisis—beginning with the 2007 housing market crash—have been used to justify further privatization of social resources, leading to historically unprecedented cuts in wages, employment and social programs throughout the global North.¶ It is not surprising, then, that cultural theory has become more and more concerned with the relation between human and non-human life and with the instrumentalities used by the former to control the latter. Broadly characterized by a "posthuman" displacement of humanist priorities of reason, rationality and Cartesian dualism, at the center of which is a human subject constructed as fundamentally different from and superior to non-human animals and life and capable of developing reliable knowledge of and control over the objective world—a wide range of cultural writing today has become concerned with the increasing subjugation of nature to human calculation and control, and call for a new inquiry into the relation of the human and its other. Some, like Giorgio Agamben, address the increasing efforts of the state to control and manage all aspects of human and non-human life (Homo Sacer; The Open). Others, like Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, focus on the efforts by corporations to privatize the knowledges, affects and technologies that have been developed through the collective energies of what they call the multitude: the efforts to enclose the digital commons in the interests of a powerful few (Commonwealth). Graham Harman goes so far as to suggest that the "being" of tools is constitutive of all being in the contemporary moment (Tool-Being), while Peter Menzel and Faith D'Alusio celebrate the displacement of homo sapiens by the notion of robo sapiens (Robo Sapiens). Among one of the most popular developments in contemporary posthumanist theory, animal studies, writers like Cary Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Kelly Oliver, and Matthew Calarco, taking their cue from Derrida's later writings (i.e., The Animal That Therefore I Am), address what is for them the instrumentalizing and unethical discourses of humanism, which justifies its violence toward non-human species by its epistemological centering of the human: the "anthropological machine" (Agamben, The Open).¶ But what drives the "new industrial revolution" (Venter) is what drove the "old" one: the use of technology to appropriate surplus labor (the source of profit) at the point of production. Profit is not derived from "nature" but labor: in order for nature to become a commodifiable resource, it must become transformed by human labor, which is itself a dialectical outcome of nature. This is another way of saying that the commodification of life on such a planetary scale today is only possible on the basis of the commodification of human labor power. Biocapitalism is first and foremost a regime of wage labor.¶ Contemporary cultural theory's concern with the effects of capitalism on non-human life, however, has mystified capital's material roots, and one of the central means by which this has been accomplished is what I call machine-thinking.

#### Capitalism’s preoccupation with endless accumulation will result in total ecological destruction and extinction

Foster 11,[John Bellamy ] Dec. 2011, Capitalism and the Accumulation of Catastrophe, Monthly Review, Vol. 63 Issue 07, <http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/capitalism-and-the-accumulation-of-catastrophe> (Aug 2012)

Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is *fairer*—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

#### The alternative is to reject capitalism through revolutionary action

Herod ‘4 James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>

 It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we�re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can�t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It�s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world.

### Off

Speculate the United States federal government removes all restrictions for solar energy production in the United States, except restriction which treat the sun as an object.

#### PIC – retain the restriction of recognizing our solar knowledge is incomplete – only we affirm the unchecked fury of the speculative position

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For Harman, the tool—any given object—is enmeshed in a set of total relations (i.e. the world). Meanwhile, each object is visible only very partially from any given perspective. "The bridge has a completely different reality for every entity it encounters: it is utterly distinct for the seagull, the idle walker, and those who may be driving across it toward a game or a funeral" (TSR 25). The word utterly here is doing a great deal of work: the claim is that the relation between the seagull and the bridge is of a radically different, wholly unrelated, kind than the relation between the idle walker and the bridge. This allows Harman to claim that "there is an absolute gulf between Heidegger's readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand" (TSR 26). No matter how it manifests itself, the bridge (or any other object) itself is always infinitely withdrawn. Any relation a walker, a seagull, or a driver in a car may have to it always radically misses what the bridge is, in itself. And any relation, in any modality, we may have with a tool, whether it be practical or contemplative, aesthetic or empirical, also always radically misses the object. Harman's object-orientation entails a concern with the "unchecked fury" of the withdrawn essence of objects (TSR 26). Doing justice to the object itself means affirming such fury, and also affirming that we never reach any object as it is in itself. But crucially, neither does any other object: objects are withdrawn from each other as radically as they are from us. The relation (or non-relation) between bolts and pylons is of exactly the same kind as between humans and the bridge: "all relations are on the same footing" (TSR 202). What's refreshing about Harman is his insistence that bolts and pylons deserve as much or more attention from philosophers as the typical objects of philosophy: language, knowledge, mind, etc.

#### Treating the sun as an accessable object undermines productive speculation – the CP retains the restriction of parataxis – their believe that we can know the sun itself instead of just the object called our “relation to the run” link turns all benefits that flow from speculation

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The obvious question arises of how objects can interact at all if they're also absolutely withdrawn from each other. The second half of Towards Speculative Realism presents Harman's development of this question as well as his solution: vicarious causation. As he has it in an essay on Husserl, "Physical Nature and the Paradox of Qualities," "if hammers, rocks, and flames withdraw from all other entities, then it needs to be explained why anything happens in the world at all" (129); and "since objects cannot touch one another directly they must be able to interact only within some sort of vicarious medium that contains each of them" (TSR 131). Harman's very weird but absolutely ingenious and elegant solution to this problem is that this medium is other objects. Relations themselves are objects. Take again the bridge example: its bolts anchor its pylons into its concrete foundation which is itself dug into the ground. These are all objects in their own right, never encountering one another, always infinitely withdrawn. But taken together, in their relations to one another, the bolts and pylons and foundation and concrete form the bridge itself—which is also wholly withdrawn, even from its constituent parts. It's objects all the way down. Except there is no question of up or down—no level of reality (of scale, complexity, durability, nature, or physical existence) is any more essential or fundamental than any other: "an atom is no more an object than a skyscraper," "an electron is no more an object than a piano," and "mountains are no more objects than hallucinated mountains" (TSR 147-48). While the bridge is certainly composed of parts, the bridge itself is not any one of these parts, nor merely their sum. The bridge names the way in which its parts are related to one another, but it is not itself reducible to this bundle of relations. Throughout, Harman's ontology of an utterly pure, totally positive, completely inaccessible object licenses speculation as the only way we may ever reach anything like an encounter with the object itself. Since "there is no way of approaching equipment [objects] directly, not even asymptotically or by degrees" (47), the only way we have of thinking the withdrawn object or vicarious causation is metaphysics, "speculative theory on the nature of ultimate reality" (TSR 49). Two consequences follow from this. First, since we always miss the object, the ground for Harman's theory of objects cannot be the object itself. This is a phenomenology without a practice of description. At no point does Harman ever really address himself to any object in particular, and it is not difficult to see why. At best we see his characteristic stylistic tic of what elsewhere he calls a "poetry of objects" (Prince 101-103): "monkeys, tornadoes, diamonds, and oil," "hammers, drills, keys, and windows," "trees, atoms, and songs. . . armies, banks, sports franchises, and fictional characters" (TSR 95, 97, 147). This is a poetry whose only device is parataxis. As poetic device, parataxis levels all differences between its terms—which, I suppose, is precisely the point. No object has any privilege or right of dignity over any other. But as a collection of essays (instead of a book on a single thinker, like Prince of Networks), Towards Speculative Realism makes particularly clear a resulting difficulty in Harman's thinking. Instead of asking about any objects in particular, the essays all treat different philosophers and their theories of objects: Heidegger and Husserl, but also Lingis, Whitehead, Latour, and DeLanda. These are uniformly creative, opening these thinkers up in novel ways. Yet even in its object-oriented instance, it seems that the object of philosophy is really only ever other philosophy.

#### Even if Speculation can be productive, they center it on an object – in this case the sun – this form of speculation is unproductive and embraces the worst forms of correlationism – if the sun worshipers decide to sacrifice people, they have no grounds to oppose it

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These are questions about the nature of speculation in its conjugation by speculative realism. Of course, meditation on the nature of speculation cuts against the grain of the aspiration of speculative realism to break out of the correlationist circle and is much attenuated in TheSpeculative Turn. Attenuated, but not ignored. Ray Brassier and Adrian Johnston hit on the problem, and Alberto Toscano's "Against Speculation" poses it most fully in his treatment of the account of speculation Meillassoux gives in chapter 2 of After Finitude. In Toscano's words, correlationism "designates those structural invariants or transcendental parameters that govern a given world or domain of correlation without themselves being open to rational explanation, deduction or derivation. In this respect, facticity is a form of reflexive ignorance" (ST 85). The "strong correlationism" of Heidegger or Wittgenstein, or really, any anti-foundational philosophy that forbids or foregoes speculation on an ultimate reality behind facticity, is thus a "new obscurantism," "a carte blanche for any and all superstitions" (ST 85). Strong correlationism is complicit with the rise of religiosity because philosophy has removed any vocabulary or grounds for discussing the absolute and irrational. Meillassoux's brilliance lies precisely in the way his thought moves past dumb wonderment at facticity by ontologizing anti-foundationalism as absolute contingency. Here, realism and speculation license each other, and this is the crux of Toscano's critique of Meillassoux. The absolute autonomy of the real, and its absolute exteriority with respect to thought, frees thought from the necessity of being a correlate of being. Yet once you give up any pretension to correlation between thought and being, how can you claim that absolute speculation will have any purchase whatsoever on the absolute of the real? The questions of to what, to whom, in what modes, in what registers, and to what degree thought is (and ought to be) bound are questions that neither The Speculative Turn, nor speculative realist philosophy more generally, has quite known how to pose—even as it also makes them unavoidable. This inability is not unrelated to the uncertainty The Speculative Turn displays in the kind of impact it wants to have. The largely unvoiced question of speculation lies at the heart of what is both flawed and crucial about this volume. If speculative realist philosophy does not quite have an account of how to answer these questions, it poses them in urgent and novel ways. This is not merely to recruit Harman, Meillassoux, and others to the correlationist concerns of critical, cultural, aesthetic theory (etc.), or of what Adrian Johnston calls "ontic disciplines." But clearly the kind of purchase thought has on the world is of concern not merely to the speculative realists, but to practitioners of any sort of humanistic or critical thinking. You might even say it's of greater importance to those of us who "do theory": from a certain altitude, the "theory" that we "do," wedded as it must be to an object or scene of inquiry, is the real object-oriented philosophy, speculative thinking that does not know how to get on without an object. The speculative realist demand to radically rethink this relation (or non-relation), and this dependency, is crucial. Whether or not you agree with Harman or Meillassoux, or any of the others, the charge from speculative realism to disciplines and practices of thought more bound to the things themselves—as we discover them in the world—lies precisely in their challenge to correlationism, that is, to our received ways of conceiving of the relation between thought and its objects.

#### Using speculation to refute conclusions based on reasons is an internal link turn to all the benefits of speculative methologies – this is an internal link turn

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Installing aesthetics as the model for the relation between thought and world would seem to obviate the problem of the correlationist circle (or that's what's in the offing), since as Shaviro would have it, the kind of resonance at issue between thought and world on this model would not name a special form of relation between a subject and an object, but all forms of relatedness between entities. Moreover, this model introduces something like a kernel or splinter of the absolute into every relation of thought and object (or, for that matter, any object with any other). It stages, in miniature, in every encounter between a thought and an object, the kind of move Meillassoux makes at the level of ontology. No appeal to any aspect of the appearance of an object will ever be able, in the last instance, to found any claim about that object whatsoever, as it is in itself. Yet such a claim is not groundless, or irrational: you can always give reasons. (Although eventually, you can only just point or gesture: don't you just see it?) And yet, since there is something fundamentally unaccountable in such a relation, it includes an appeal to something absolute—it is asserted, universally, without being subsumed under a concept. This very well may look like an attempt to square the correlationist circle even while claiming to be outside it, reprising "postmodern skepticism" by denying that thought ever really grasps its object, staying comfortably within the navel-gazing domain of human culture, all while making rather extravagant appeals to first philosophy and metaphysics. By the same token, speculative realism, from certain angles, takes on an aspect of remarkable hubris, even megalomania, even as it claims to get us beyond self-involved anthropocentrism. Or I may seem to be attempting an accommodationist compromise by articulating a position in critical and cultural theory that isn't undermined by the critiques of correlationism that found speculative realist philosophy, and from which seemingly antagonistic arguments about first philosophy, ontology, and metaphysics seem not just relevant but urgent. It's possible that I am. In any event, my goal is to articulate a way in which speculative realism can pose a productive challenge to critical and cultural theory. Whatever the solution or resolution, its challenge consists in thinking in new and radical ways the importance, stakes, and force of speculative thinking within critical thought about art, literature, and culture. At a time like this, with the defunding or outright dissolution of institutional spaces dedicated to the practice of speculation, we need more and better ways to say how and why thought matters.

#### Their choice to single out the sun refutes the entire ontology of their knowledge production objections

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Speculative realism of all flavors proposes to move past the Kantian inheritance of correlationism by insisting that philosophy must return to its pre-critical (pre-Kantian) vocation of speculation about the Absolute. Or the real. Indeed, the two seem to become equivalent. Bryant, Harman, and Srnicek acknowledge in their introduction that "this activity of 'speculation' may be cause for concern amongst some readers, for it might suggest a return to pre-critical philosophy, with its dogmatic belief in the powers of pure reason." Continuing, they claim that speculation "aims at something 'beyond' the critical and linguistic turns. As such, it recuperates the pre-critical sense of 'speculation' as a concern with the Absolute, while also taking into account the undeniable progress that is due to the labour of critique. The works collected here are a speculative wager on the possible returns from a renewed attention to reality itself" (ST 3). It seems to me that it is not so much speculation or its promotion that should be a cause for concern, nor attention to reality, but rather the elision of the difference between the real and the absolute. This elision is evident in the characterization of much contemporary thought as anti-realist. If "the basic claim of realism is that a world exists independent of ourselves" (ST 16), it seems a bit extravagant to claim Marxists are anti-realist, or phenomenologists, or analytical philosophers of mind, or even such much-maligned language-oriented philosophers as Derrida or Gadamer or Wittgenstein. And yet, the editors claim that a general anti-realist trend has manifested itself in continental philosophy in a number of ways, but especially through preoccupation with such issues as death and finitude, an aversion to science, a focus on language, culture, and subjectivity to the detriment of material factors, an anthropocentric stance toward nature, a relinquishing of the search for absolutes, and an acquiescence to the specific conditions of our historical thrownness. (ST 4) A concern with finitude and death, or an investigation of (but not acquiescence to!) our historical conditions and conditionedness, aren't on their face anti-realist, but are rather ways of reckoning with the real from our situation within it, of acknowledging our failure to know it as it is in itself, of coping with its recalcitrance and indeterminacy and excess. The speculative realist asks us to leave behind what we think we know or experience of the real, for we cannot know this radical exterior, "the great outdoors." Thus it becomes the task of speculation to think the real as the absolute. And ontology, understood as resurgent metaphysics, takes priority over epistemology. As with Harman, such a position obliges speculative realism to hold that there are no phenomenological or epistemological criteria by which we might evaluate such accounts of the absolutely real and their competing claims. This is the problem The Speculative Turn both presents and embodies. Since knowledge seems to be out of the question (or is just a boring question), the thinking on offer in this volume is by turns ingenious, athletic, and inspiring, or tortured, baroque, and impenetrable—and radically divergent. The disagreement turns mostly on the nature of objects and the nature of change, or the not-quite-parallel problems of relations vs. objects and process vs. stasis. Which is just to say that they argue a great deal about the nature of the real, as befits realists. It seems less clear what, exactly, their grounds for dispute are.

### Case

#### They cannot overcome economic systems.

Arkady Plontisky, 1995, , Professor of English and Theory and Cultural Studies, Purdue University, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, p. 111

Indeed, as Bataille's discourse shows with extraordinary power, it is the economic insistence on consumption at the multiple and often interacting levels of theoretical economies—economic, political, conceptual—that is most problematic. The theoretical problem is a metaphoric loss of the economy of loss and thus of the general economy. It is not that consumption and the pleasure of consumption are not important or theoretically and otherwise pleasurable. To reverse the configuration absolutely and to privilege expenditure unconditionally would be just as untenable. As I indicated earlier, Bataille's heavy insistence on waste and expenditure must be seen as problematic in this respect, and is "saved" only by the enormous labyrinthine complexity of Bataille's inscription of these concepts.

#### Inevitable extinction is wrong.

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I shall assume that time cannot be separated from space, and that time is essentially a view of what happens to space. If we see time as encompassing all of space, it is difficult to see time as rushing headlong towards an end, since we must imagine time as having to move through the tangled matter of space to get to any end: a tortuous procedure. Time does not cut through space instantly like a magic knife towards an end, so why should we view all time from its end? Moreover, time is ‘everything that happens’, involving the irreducible durations of pleasure or pain, slavery or sovereignty. Again, with such a rich view of time, it is hard to see how time can be authentically described as slipping easily towards its extinction. Since time is made up of everything that occurs, the philosophical act of analysing time from the point of view of the annihilation of all occurrence is narrow to the most extreme degree. How can this backward glance, this posthumous look at time from the illusory vantage point of nothingness, not be an emaciated view, a ‘little’ view? How can such a narrow, such a restricted view of time not be a slave perspective in the Nietzschean sense?

#### Even without absolute truth we can create provisional consensus and common understanding

Ferguson 2002 Yale Ferguson (Professor of International Relations at Rutgers) and Richard Mansbach (Professor of International Relations at Iowa State) 2002 International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

#### Predictions are inevitable and good

George Friedman (founder of Stratfor) May 2008 “The Love of One’s Own and the Importance of Place” Stratfor

Forecasting is built into the human condition. Each action a human being takes is intended to have a certain outcome. The right to assume that outcome derives from a certain knowledge of how things work. Sometimes, the action has unexpected and unintended consequences. The knowledge of how things work is imperfect. But there is a huge gulf between the uncertainty of a prediction and the impossibility of a prediction. When I get up and turn on the hot water, it is with the expectation that the hot water will be there. It isn’t always there and I may not have a full understanding of why it will be there, but in general, it is there and I can predict that. A life is made up of a fabric of such expectations and predictions. There is no action taken that is not done with the expectation, reasonable or not, erroneous or not, of some predictable consequence. The search for predictability suffuses all of the human condition. Students choose careers by trying to predict what would please them when they are 30 years older, what would be useful and therefore make them money and so on. Businesses forecast what can be sold and to whom. We forecast the weather, the winners of elections, the consequences of war and so on. There is no level on which human beings live that they don’t make forecasts and, therefore, on which they don’t act as if the world were to some degree predictable.

#### Predictions are good – they are key to prevent catastrophic violence even if they are inaccurate

Fuyuki Kurasawa Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004 Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

#### Planning for uncertain events is good- mere speculation ensures that we only speculate on things that we already agree with

Michael **Fitzsimmons 2007** [survival, vol 48, no 4, p.139]

Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that 'many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain'. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that 'what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.'34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining 'a standard of judgment' from 'knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense'. Scientific inquiry into the 'laws of probability' for any given strategic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, **analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers**. Nevertheless, Clausewitz's implication seems to be that **the burden of proof in any debates about planning should belong to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of evidence and probabilistic reasoning**. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others' presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not 'what is your inferred causation, General?' Above all, not, 'what are your values, Mr. Secretary?'… If someone says 'a fair chance'… ask, 'if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?' If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences… Once differing odds have been quoted, the question 'why?' can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert's basis for linking 'if' with 'then' gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.'35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strategic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May's point - prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers' beliefs and that might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a decision explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at the initial strategy should heighten the decision-maker's sensitivity toward changes in the environment that would suggest the need for adjustments to that strategy. In this way, prediction enhances rather than undermines strategic flexibility. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in planning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the distinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome - that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. \* \* \* One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relationship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz's work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tendencies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational implications, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but **assumptions must be made in the end**. Clausewitz's 'standard of judgment' for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambiguous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future

#### Energy POLICY matters and we need policy action to address the pressing energy needs of the US and the world- Must evaluate consequences

Wirth, Gray & Podesta, ‘3 The Future of Energy Policy Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray, and John D. Podesta Timothy E. Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former U.S. Senator from Colorado. C. Boyden Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President George H.W. Bush. John D. Podesta is Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and served as Chief of Staff to former President Bill Clinton. Volume 82 • Number 4 Foreign Affairs 2003 Council on Foreign Relations

¶ A century ago, Lord Selborne, the ﬁrst lord of the Admiralty,¶ dismissed the idea of fueling the British navy with something other than¶ coal, which the island nation had in great abundance. “The substitution¶ of oil for coal is impossible,” he pronounced, “because oil does not¶ exist in this world in su⁄cient quantities.” Seven years later, the young¶ Winston Churchill was appointed ﬁrst lord and charged with winning¶ the escalating Anglo-German race for naval superiority. As Daniel¶ Yergin chronicled in The Prize, Churchill saw that oil would increase¶ ship speed and reduce refueling time—key strategic advantages—and¶ ordered oil-burning battleships to be built, committing the navy to¶ this new fuel. Churchill’s was a strategic choice, bold, creative, and¶ farsighted. The energy choices the world faces today are no less¶ consequential, and America’s response must be as insightful. ¶ Energy is fundamental to U.S. domestic prosperity and national¶ security. In fact, the complex ties between energy and U.S. national¶ interests have drawn tighter over time. The advent of globalization,¶ the growing gap between rich and poor, the war on terrorism, and¶ the need to safeguard the earth’s environment are all intertwined¶ with energy concerns.¶ The profound changes of recent decades and the pressing challenges¶ of the twenty-ﬁrst century warrant recognizing energy’s central role in¶ America’s future and the need for much more ambitious and creative¶ approaches. Yet the current debate about U.S. energy policy is mainly¶ about tax breaks for expanded production, access to public lands, and¶ nuances of electricity regulation—di⁄cult issues all, but inadequate for¶ the larger challenges the United States faces. The staleness of the policy¶ dialogue reﬂects a failure to recognize the importance of energy to¶ the issues it aªects: defense and homeland security, the economy, and the¶ environment. What is needed is a purposeful, strategic energy policy,¶ not a grab bag drawn from interest-group wish lists.¶ U.S. energy policies to date have failed to address three great challenges. The ﬁrst is the danger to political and economic security¶ posed by the world’s dependence on oil. Next is the risk to the global¶ environment from climate change, caused primarily by the combustion¶ of fossil fuels. Finally, the lack of access by the world’s poor to modern¶ energy services, agricultural opportunities, and other basics needed¶ for economic advancement is a deep concern.¶ None of these problems of dependence, climate change, or poverty¶ can be solved overnight, but aggressive goals and practical short-term¶ initiatives can jump-start the move to clean and secure energy practices.¶ The key challenges can be overcome with a blend of carefully targeted¶ policy interventions that build on the power of the market, publicprivate partnerships in ﬁnancing and technology development, and,¶ perhaps most important, the development of a political coalition¶ that abandons traditional assumptions and brings together energy¶ interests that have so far engaged only in conﬂict. Turning this¶ ambitious, long-term agenda into reality requires a sober assessment¶ of the United States’ critical energy challenges and the interests that¶ can be mobilized for the necessary political change.

#### Abstract intellectualism is useless—environmental philosophers should orient themselves towards real-life problems.

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So¶ animal rights philosophers have been missing the chance to find a way to many people's hearts¶ . But why is¶ this¶ so crucial? I think it¶ is crucial because it is the wrong way of practising political philosophy¶ . To see why, let usrecall a classical book by Max Weber (1968). In Politics als Beruf,¶ Weber presented an important distinction betweentwo approaches to moral reasoning. One is the 'ethics of conviction', which often follows deontology¶ , or a set of rules of conduct;¶ the other is the ethics of responsibility, according to which it would be irresponsible to actaccording to one's principles alone: rather, one should also consider what others will do as a result of one'sactions¶ . It seems to me that political philosophy has this approach in mind.¶ Political philosophy should orient itself towards real-life problems, including the problem of public good and collective action, where people tendto react in certain undesirable ways to what others do¶ . In such cases there must be a way of taking into account theeffect that my actions have (we include here both what I claim to be doing and the reasons I give for doing it) on others'behaviour and actions.¶ Political reasoning would then have two stages: first, a discussion of principles, but second,a consideration of their actual application and their effect on others' behaviour¶ .¶ However, many environmentalphilosophers¶ , while ascribing rights to animals,¶ ignore the way others may react¶ . I believe that many¶ people whomight have been persuaded of the importance of treating animals fairly¶ (using the argument of what cruelty can doto the human soul)¶ will regard the notion of animal rights as so obscure or absurd that they dismiss as madphilosophers who suggest this idea, and scorn all such claims as nonsense¶ .¶

#### Implementation of environmental policy must be considered

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However, it would be wrong, if not dangerous, to blame the 'other'. From the prophets in biblical times to the French revolutionaries and the early Fabians,¶ history is full of examples of theorists and philosophers who abandoned all hope of persuading others throughdeliberation, and became impatient and hence more radical in their ideas¶ . This explains why the shift fromhumanistic to misanthropic attitudes has been rapid.¶ Perhaps the 'easiest' way to solve a problem is to lose faithin a form of gradual change that can still remain respectful of humans. Such an attitude¶ , I believe,¶ onlybrings about a new series of problems encompassing dictatorship, totalitarianism, and lack of personal freedom¶ .¶ In this book I seek to maintain the philosophical impetus, not to point the finger at the politicians or the activists. Rather, I wish to examine ourselves—the philosophers who engage in discussing the environment—to discover how we might construct a theory that is much more accessible to the activists and the general public (without relinquishingany of our goals), and which can be harnessed to the aims of political philosophy. Here, the counter-argument would go something like this: 'OK, so the argumentation supplied by environmental philosophers is so removed from that used by activists and governments. So what? The only outcome of this is that more arguments, or, if you like, a pluralistic set of arguments, will emerge.Some arguments are relevant to academia alone; others can be used in politics. Thus, for example, in the university we could maintain an ecocentric environmental philosophy, 7 whereas in politics anthropocentric 8 arguments would dominate.' In response to this, it could be argued that plurality of argument is indeed welcome. Moreover, as we saw earlier,¶ thedivergence between¶ , say,¶ ecocentric environmental philosophy and anthropocentric environmental philosophy is not so vast in terms of the policies they recommend¶ . In fact,¶ as John Barry argues, 'reformednaturalistic humanism' is capable of supporting a stewardship ethics just as well¶ (J. Barry 1999 :ch. 3).¶ But¶ my point is that¶ saving the environment is not just a matter of theory: it is an urgent political mission¶ .In a democratic system, however,¶ one cannot expect policies to be decided without giving any thought to¶ how these policies should be explained to the public¶ , and thereby gain legitimacy¶ .¶ In other words, the rationale of a policy is an increasingly important, if not inseparable, part of the policy; in particular, the openness and transparency of the democratic regime makes the rationale a crucial aspect of the policy¶ .¶ A policy whose rationale is not open to the public, or one that is believed to be arrived at through a process not open to the public, is considered a-democratic¶ (cf. Ezrahi 1990). Consequently,¶ a policy'slegitimacy is owed not only to its effectiveness, but also to the degree of moral persuasion and convictionit generates within the public arena. So, when constructing environmental policies¶ in democratic regimes,¶ there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics, but also by politicians and activists¶ .¶ Hencethe first question in this book is, Why has the major part of environmental philosophy failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? The first part of this book, then, discusses this question and offers two explanations in response. These explanations are based on the premissthat environmental ethics and political theory should be differentiated and well defined so that later on they may join hands, rather than that they should be united in a single theory. It is assumed that they answer two questions. Environmental ethics is about the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. Political theory with regard to the environment relates to the institutions needed to implement and support environmental policies. Thus, the failure to distinguish properly between environmental ethics and political theory underlies the failure of the major part of environmental philosophy to penetrate environmental policy and provide its rationale. In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way¶ environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away fromanthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and ecocentrism¶ . 9 My argumentis that¶ the public on the whole is not ready for this¶ , and therefore many activists and potential¶ supporters of the environmental movement become alienated from the philosophical discourse on theenvironment ¶ .¶ In addition, I suggest that the reason for the gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is thatenvironmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophyrequires the third: the public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and thegeneral public (and not just those of professional philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to include political and democratic philosophy. Andyet, most of environmental philosophers' efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and 'biocentrism'. Environmental philosophers have been pushedin this direction out of a genuine desire to seek out the 'good' and the truth, in an effort to ascertain the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. I suggestthat¶ environmental philosophers¶ should not limit themselves to discussing the moral grounds for attitudes, or to trying to reveal the good and the truth, although these areimportant and fascinating questions. At least some of them¶ should instead go beyond this and address the matter of the necessaryinstitutions for implementing policies, and finally, and of no less importance, find a way to persuadeothers to act on behalf of the environment¶ . In other words,¶ while there is a place formeta-ethics¶ , it shouldnot be the only approach to philosophizing about the environment;¶ it should not replace political philosophy

#### Any environmental strategy that fails to activate political forces will fail – only state action produces effective change.

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Michael, “Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?,” Global Environmental Politics 1:3, August 2001, http://merlin.allegheny.edu/employee/m/mmaniate/savetheworld.pdf, page 32-33,

And yet mainstream environmentalism has not always advanced an individualized consumeristic strategy for redressing environmental ills. Even during¶ the turn of the last century, a time of zealous rediscovery of the wonders of¶ efªciency and scientiªc management, “the dynamics of conservation,” observes¶ famed environmental historian Samuel P. Hays, “with its tension between the¶ centralizing tendencies of system and expertise on the one hand and the decentralization of localism on the other . . .” fueled healthy debate over the causes of¶ and cures for environmental ills.¶ 19¶ Throughout the 20¶ th¶ century, in fact, mainstream environmentalism has demonstrated an ability to foster multiple and simultaneous interpretations on where we are and where we are heading.¶ But that ability has, today, clearly become impaired. Although public support for things environmental has never been greater, it is so because the public¶ increasingly understands environmentalism as an individual, rational, cleanly¶ apolitical process that can deliver a future that works without raising voices or¶ mobilizing constituencies. As individual consumers and recyclers we are supplied with ample and easy means of “doing our bit.” The result, though, is often¶ dissonant and sometimes bizarre: consumers wearing “save the earth” T-shirts,¶ for example, speak passionately against recent rises in gasoline prices when approached by television news crews; shoppers drive all over town in their gasoline-guzzling SUVs in search of organic lettuce or shade-grown coffee; and diligent recyclers expend far more fossil-fuel energy on the hot water spent to¶ meticulously clean a tin can than is saved by its recycling.¶ Despite these jarring contradictions, the technocratic, sanitary and individualized framing of environmentalism prevails, largely because it is continually reinforced. Consider, for example, recent millennial issues of Time and¶ Newsweek that look to life in the future.¶ 20¶ They paint a picture of smart appliances, computer-guided automobiles, clean neighborhoods, eco-friendly energy¶ systems, and happy citizens. How do we get to this future? Not through bold¶ political leadership or citizen-based debate within enabling democratic institutions—but rather via consumer choice: informed, decentralized, apolitical, individualized. Corporations will build a better mousetrap, consumers will buy it,¶ and society will be transformed for the better. A struggle-free eco-revolution¶ awaits, one made possible by the combination of technological innovation and¶ consumer choice with a conscience.¶ The “better mousetrap theory of social change” so prevalent in these popular news magazines was coined by Langdon Winner, a political-science professor and expert on technological politics, who ªrst introduced the term in an essay on the demise of the appropriate technology movement of the 1970s.¶ 21¶ Like¶ the militant recyclers and dead-serious green consumers of today, appropriate¶ technologists of the 1970s were the standard bearers for the individualization of¶ responsibility. The difference between then and now is that appropriate technology lurked at the fringes of a 1970s American environmental politics more¶ worried about corporate accountability than consumer choice. Today, green¶ consumption, recycling and Cuisinart-social-change occupy the heart of US ecopolitics. Both then and now, such individualization is alarming, for as Winner¶ notes:¶ The inadequacies of such ideas are obvious. Appropriate technologists were¶ unwilling to face squarely the facts of organized social and political power.¶ Fascinated by dreams of a spontaneous, grass-roots revolution, they avoided¶ any deep-seeking analysis of the institutions that control the direction of¶ technological and economic development. In this happy self-conªdence¶ they did not bother to devise strategies that might have helped them overcome obvious sources of resistance. The same judgment that Marx and¶ Engels passed on the utopians of the nineteenth century apply just as well to¶ the appropriate technologists of the 1970s: they were lovely visionaries, naive about the forces that confronted them.¶ 22¶